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Skunk Works Bill Contains 
Some Stinky Provisions 
To the Editor: 
It's hard not to be sympathetic to the Anti-Skunk 
Works Corporate Tax Act of 1999, as presented by 
Professor Calvin Johnson. (See Tax Notes, July 19, 1999, 
p. 443). Who wants to be seen as defending abusive tax 
shelters, or, for that matter, who wants to defend that 
much maligned species, the skunk? 
Nevertheless, I have reservations about the attempt 
to codify already existing anti-avoidance doctrines 
(Title I of the Act), particularly when that codification 
is supposed to have effect throughout the Internal 
Revenue Code. Putting substance-over-form, sham 
transaction, step transaction doctrines, etc., into 
statutory form will have little substantive effect, other 
than to increase confusion and create innumerable new 
, 1!'~ interpretational issues to slow down the enforcement V process. 
Why codify? Professor Johnson offers several 
reasons, none of which is persuasive. Since looking to 
substance has been taken for granted in American 
jurisprudence for decades, would codification really 
"absolve the courts from accusations of judicial ac-
tivism"? Even if it would, what does that have to do 
with the vast majority of transactions that will never 
reach the courtroom? Similarly, would codification 
really affect corporate tax opinion writers? Why are 
they ignoring time-honored doctrine now? 
Professor Johnson notes that many other countries 
are adopting (or at least are considering) General Anti-
Abuse Rules, and that's true. But in many cases, that's 
because there isn't an arsenal of judicial (or other) 
weapons already available for tax enforcement officials 
to use. 
One needs to consider an anti-avoidance statute if 
one is operating in a relatively formalistic system that 
doesn't already have a well-developed substance-over-
form doctrine. But the United States isn't in that posi-
tion. We haven't had a push for a statutory anti-avoid-
ance rule, in part at least, because we already have 
anti-avoidance doctrines in place. Maybe the doctrines 
aren't being enforced - isn't that the real problem 
here?- but they certainly exist. 
, . So - what are the new, often very general rules in ~' Title I of the Anti-Skunk Works Act supposed to add? 
-~ Professor Johnson writes that "the doctrines have a 
70-year history of interpretation in the courts. The his-
tory of the doctrines tames the rules and means that 
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they are not monsters or surprises." True enough if 
we're tall<ing about the old rules. But how do old judi-
cial interpretations tame new rules with new, and in-
evitably ambiguous, language? Or if the new language 
merely codifies "common law and common sense," as 
the report says, what's the point? 
When I look at the proposed statutory language, like 
any good (or bad) tax lawyer I see interpretational 
issues. For example: 
The determination of any item of gross income, 
deductions, or credits shall be made according to 
the substance of a transaction and not its form, 
except that taxpayers shall be bound by the form 
chosen. 
I think I know, in general, what that's supposed to do 
because, in general, I know what the substance-over-
form cases do. But I'd be more comfortable with this 
as a statutory rule if I were sure what "form" is sup-
posed to mean in this context. 
Why even propose statutory language 
that raises interpretational issues like 
these, and therefore diverts attention 
from the abuses that need to be 
addressed? 
If I'm a taxpayer, I'm bound by the form of the 
transaction, but what's that? The label I put on various 
documents? (If so, I won't use labels.) The label some-
one else puts on my structure? The way I initially re-
port the transaction for tax purposes? Those are differ-
ent conceptions of "form," and I can find cases 
interpreting "form" in each of those ways. Would this 
new statutory rule mean that transactions where tax-
payers have been able to plan on the basis of substance 
(say, like, variations on the bootstrap transaction 
blessed in Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 
1954)) are no longer going to work? Surely that 
shouldn't happen, but why, given the language of the 
Anti-Skunk Works Act, wouldn't it? 
Why even propose statutory language that raises 
interpretational issues like these, and therefore diverts 
attention from the abuses that need to be addressed? 
"Steps undertaken to accomplish a larger goal shall 
be ignored" is another principle that sounds fine in the 
abstract, until one stops to wonder what a "step" is 
and what a "larger goal" would be (making money, 
avoiding taxes, preparing for the Second Corning?). 
There's already some judicial understanding on those 
633 
:.: 
COMMENTARY I LEITERS TO THE EDITOR 
issues, and enforcers are going to look to those cases 
anyway. What's the statute supposed to add? 
The "tax is not a profit center" and "no negative tax" 
rules, relying on present value computations and such, 
strike me as unadministrable if taken seriously. They're 
attempts to give the illusion of precision. I'm skeptical 
that borderline transactions ought to be struck down 
on the basis of such suspect computations, and, for the 
abusive transactions that we should all be concerned 
about, the flimsiness is obvious without the new 
statute on the books. 
I Title I of the Anti-Skunk Works Act is a "There oughta be a law" reaction to a situation where there already is a law. 
I'm certainly not going to criticize attempts to dis-
cern policy, structure, and intent in interpreting 
statutes, and I agree with language in the report sug-
gesting that "courts and administration [must] make 
sense of the system enacted by Congress before being 
sure of the meaning of separate words." But I hesitate 
to try to codify that general principle. 
And the language proposed to do that lends itself 
to ridicule: 
The text of the Internal Revenue Code shall be 
interpreted to reach results consistent with the 
policy, structure, and intent of Congress at the 
time that it enacted the provisions. 
What provisions? What times are we focusing on when 
a transaction implicates (as will often be the case) pro-
visions enacted at different times, often without con-
gressional thought about how the provisions fit 
together? Of course we need to try to make sense of 
the code as a whole, but I'm at a loss as to how that 
proposed statutory provision is supposed to help us 
do that. 
Title I of the Anti-Skunk Works Act is a "There 
oughta be a law" reaction to a situation where there 
already is a law. The basic anti-avoidance doctrines are 
already on the books. Instead of debating Title I, we 
should be (1) urging that the already existing principles 
be used more vigorously in enforcement, and (2) ad-
vocating the statutory revisions needed to deal with 
particular abuses. 
Most of the rest of the Anti-Skunk Works Act gets 
down to the nitty-gritty. That's where the focus should 
be in statutory change. 
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Very truly yDurs, 
Erik M. Jensen 
Brennan Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve 
University 
Cleveland, Ohio 
July 20, 1999 
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